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The international banking crisis and  
its impact on Argentina 
Central Bank of Argentina 
1.   Cross-border bank lending to emerging market economies (EMEs) 
(a)  The role of supply and demand factors  
The volume of trade financing usually depends on the size of international trade. However, 
during the recent crisis there was a slump in trade financing related to the troubles in one 
particular large financial institution, which led to a sharp decline in world trade. Another 
significant factor behind the retrenchment in trade financing was the increase in the 
perception of counterparty risk, which is critical for this type of operation where, typically, 
more than three financial institutions are involved in a single operation. 
In this regard, there was an increase in import payments in Argentina between the last 
quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009, which led to a reduction in outstanding commercial 
debt and an increase in local trade financing (see Figure 1 below). 
Figure 1 
Trade in goods and trade financing 
 
All in all, the liquidity in the local banking system was high enough to allow a normal 
functioning of the economy without foreign lending for some time (broad liquidity, which 
includes banking sector holdings of central bank papers, in the financial system is above 
40% of deposits whereas narrow liquidity occurs at a rate of almost 30% – see Figure 2). 
At the same time, interest rates on foreign currency denominated loans in the local banking 
system were cheaper than loans from abroad. Regulatory policies set in previous years to 
deter currency mismatches in the domestic financial system together with the relaxation of 
minimum liquidity requirements for foreign currency denominated deposits at the onset of the 
crisis allowed the local banking system to increase lending in foreign currency for trade 
operations. As a result, there was an increase in the proportion of local trade financing in 
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Figure 2  
Systemic liquidity 
 
Given the particular situation facing Argentina in recent years, financing in the economy has 
been more reliant on domestic savings and less dependent on international capital flows, 
which is one of the key reasons for the relatively good performance of the local economy 
when compared to the rest of the world and to previous international crises. 
(b)  Types of lending that were hardest hit 
Until the financial crisis became a fully fledged economic crisis, commercial lending from 
abroad registered 10 consecutive quarters of growth but, starting in the last quarter of 2008, 
it declined by more than 50% in six months. 
However, financial lending began to fall only in the fourth quarter of 2008 and by just 4.5% 
against the previous period and it recovered in the first three months of 2009 increasing 
again by 0.2%. 
(c)   Cross-border lending terms  
There has been no significant change in the terms of lending. Neither the duration of 
outstanding debt (around two years) nor interest rates (although the average rate remained 
stable, the spread over Libor increased by more than 100 basis points (bp)) have changed 
significantly since the last few months of 2008. 
Nevertheless, there has been a significant change in the types of instruments issued since 
the beginning of the crisis. There has been a move from financing via loans to issuing debt 
instruments. 
(d)   Parent financing of affiliates versus unrelated parties 
Although there was a decline in the amount of external lending, the non-financial private 
sector showed a decline in lending from foreign financial institutions, whereas the financial 
sector remained financed by related financial institutions at pre-crisis levels. 
Broad Bank Liquidity
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2.   Domestic bank intermediation: domestically owned versus 
foreign-owned banks 
(a)   Changes in bank business models in the domestic market  
Domestic financial entities exhibit high liquidity levels. The financial system’s total liquid 
assets
1 amount to 30% of deposits, almost 7 percentage points (pp) above the figure 
recorded prior to the start of the subprime crisis. All groups of banks have maintained high 
liquidity levels (public banks, domestic private banks and foreign institutions), even showing 
an increase in liquidity levels in the last two years. Moreover, financial system liquidity 
amounts to 42% of deposits if holdings of central bank bills and notes are included.  
In order to ensure the adequate management of liquidity risk, the Central Bank of Argentina 
(BCRA) developed additional liquidity windows with non-traditional collateral and introduced 
changes to the rediscount window (with pre-assessments of collateral and enhanced access 
to all funding sources, not only deposits) and implemented larger facilities on the repo market 
(new lines in domestic and foreign currency). It also started auctioning repo options, 
anticipated the buyback of central bank bills and notes (secondary market, automatic facility 
and put options) and made open market operations more flexible by making more types of 
government bonds eligible as collateral. These measures, combined with the BCRA’s role as 
lender of last resort, consolidated a sound banking system position in order to face liquidity 
risk.  
The severity of the global economic scenario was reflected in a moderate worsening of local 
economic activity during the first few months of 2009, with some economic sectors adjusting 
their output levels. This framework led to a slight decrease in the strong performance 
demonstrated by domestic financial intermediation vis-à-vis companies and households over 
the previous few years. Private sector credit growth slowed, showing a 5% year-on-year 
(y-o-y) increase, below the outstanding annual average expansion recorded in the previous 
three years. Whereas in the period 2007–08 the rise in private sector lending stock was 
predominantly driven by households loans (especially in terms of credit cards and personal 
loans), this framework gradually changed, augmenting the role of productive companies in 
bank financing in 2009. 
Bank deposits continued to be the main source of funding for credit to households and firms, 
and there was no need to resort to central bank assistance. After growing steadily over the 
last few years, deposits now represent more than two thirds of financial institutions’ liabilities, 
and are significantly boosted by both time and sight deposits. Further, domestic banks do not 
depend on foreign financing, thereby minimising any possible adverse effects associated 
with the volatility of international capital flows during the last two years. In particular, the 
financial system’s outstanding obligations (ON) and foreign credit lines currently represent 
3% of total banking liabilities (almost 1.5 pp less than two years ago) and are mainly 
channelled to local and foreign private banks. 
Private banks have shown a lower credit increase since the beginning of the international 
financial crisis, while public institutions have continued to expand credit at a remarkable 
pace. Regarding credit expansion to the private sector, November 2009 data show that, 
while public banks grew by 19.3% y-o-y, in the same period, domestic private banks grew by 
9.8% and foreign private banks fell by 2.8%. As a consequence, public sector financial 
institutions have been progressively increasing their market share (almost 30.2% of total 
credit), while both private domestic and foreign banks have been slowly reducing their share 
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(34.3% and 31.9%, respectively, the latter being mainly led by European global financial 
institutions
2). 
In a global context of continuing uncertain economic conditions, the repayment capacity of 
local households and firms gradually came under pressure. Although it showed a slight 
increase, non-performance of credit still remains at a historically low level and, following a 
hike between October 2008 and August 2009, it is currently showing signs of a gradual 
reduction. The activity levels of some productive sectors were partially affected by the 
economic crisis, while households began to face some  challenges. After reaching a 
minimum of 2.8% in September 2008, some of the credit risk assumed by banks started to 
materialise, and the non-performance ratio gradually rose to almost 3.8% of loans to the 
private sector in July 2009. In that month, the increase in the non-performing loan (NPL) 
indicator stopped and subsequently began to fall. This trend has been mostly observed in 
domestic and foreign private banks. In line with this movement, credit line interest rates 
showed a moderate increase among all bank groups. 
The moderate increase in private sector non-performance was being driven by household 
credit (due to higher levels of indebtedness), in particular consumption lines. Households’ 
NPLs account for 5.2% of total financing to this sector, almost 1.5 pp above the figure 
observed two years ago – this trend has been observed among all groups of private 
institutions (local and foreign). This evolution can also be seen in corporate loans, but the 
ratio is still at a very low level (2.5% non-performance). In order to tackle this situation, banks 
have provision coverage that exceeds NPLs, thereby enabling them to face greater levels of 
arrears without significantly affecting their solvency levels. This coverage amounts to almost 
118% for the financial system, and is even higher in public banks.  
Banking sector solvency has remained at adequate levels, due to both the new capital 
injections received (almost USD 6 billion since 2002 and USD 600 million since the onset of 
the subprime crisis) and the recovery of traditional sources of revenue. All groups of financial 
entities exceed internationally recommended and local prudential solvency levels. Financial 
system capital compliance in terms of risk-weighted assets totals nearly 18%, and has 
remained at similar levels for the last few years.  
The moderation of banking activity has not prevented the financial system from continuing to 
accrue book profits, reaching almost a five-year period with consecutive nominal utilities (an 
average return on assets (ROA) of 1.4% in the 2005–08 period and 2.4% annualised in the 
first nine months of 2009). These gains are being mainly driven by the more stable revenue 
sources, net interest income and service income margin, which currently account for 7.9% of 
bank assets (above the level of the last few years). Operating costs and loan loss charges 
are gradually increasing, reaching 6.6% and only 1.1% of assets, respectively. Regarding 
profits, during the first few months of 2009, while private banks showed an ROA of 3.1% and 
a return on equity (ROE) of 23.7% (at annualised rates), public banks showed 1.3% and 
13.9%, respectively. 
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3.   Impact on the financial markets 
(a)   Impact on the foreign exchange and domestic money markets 
Foreign exchange (FX) markets remained highly liquid over the crisis period, both spot and 
futures, although there was a setback in the money market which was partly policy-driven as 
a means to prevent a feedback loop to the FX market. 
However, it is worth noting that, after three episodes of stress in the local market, a fourth 
one occurred at the beginning of 2009 but had no major impact on the money market, as can 
be seen from the evolution of the interest rate. 
Figure 3 
Local FX and money markets 
 
Private sector deposits also showed a remarkable performance when compared to the 
previous crisis. Local currency deposits remained relatively stable while foreign currency 
deposits showed an upward trend for several consecutive months. 
To encourage a gradual reduction in the mismatch between assets and liabilities in foreign 
currency, the financial policy implemented by the BCRA established that deposits in dollars 
could only be used to make loans in dollars, and that loans in dollars should only be granted 
to companies and households recording dollar-linked income. In addition, limits were placed 
on positions in foreign currency and capital requirements for foreign currency mismatching. 
The development of hedge markets was encouraged in order to provide market solutions to 
this risk (see Figure 4, left-hand panel). As a result of this series of measures, foreign 
currency mismatches are currently well below the levels recorded four years earlier, 
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Figure 4  
Currency mismatch and FX futures markets 
 
(b)   Effects on the local money markets 
Different factors affected the local money markets in EMEs according to their level of 
interconnectedness with the international markets. In some cases, the margin calls from 
parents’ institutions on developed economies were one of the key drivers of the funding 
drain. 
On the other hand, when risk appetite was at its highest level, carry trade on FX markets 
between EMEs had a significant impact on some countries. 
With the onset of the crisis, the flight to quality and to safety hinged on those kinds of 
speculations, leading to a decrease in money market liquidity and a significant impact on the 
currencies involved. 
(c)  Effects of the crisis on secured and unsecured interbank lending (local 
currency) 
As mentioned above, the local financial market operates with very high liquidity levels. This is 
reflected in the reduced levels of interbank lending. However, at some points during the crisis 
there were some spikes in interest rates, which were more related to local circumstances 
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Figure 5  
Local money market: secured and unsecured lending 
 
(d)  Difficulties in the local currency government debt market 
A remarkable feature during the pre-crisis period was the performance of local markets in 
EMEs. They witnessed a surge in long-dated local currency bond issuance by some 
countries, and an appetite for these assets as more EMEs became rated as investment 
grade and were thus allowed to be incorporated into institutional investors’ portfolios. 
As the crisis spread from subprime mortgages to the whole financial system, EMEs started to 
suffer a sudden stop episode, not only in the local markets but also in the international ones. 
More recently, there was a return to the markets for sovereign and corporate bond issuance 
in EMEs, but for the moment, it is mostly confined to the international markets. 
Thus, following a period of de-dollarisation of EME debt, the crisis brought back the need to 
issue bonds in developed economies’ currencies (it is interesting to note the issuance of 
samurai bonds by some countries even during a difficult period for the yen). 
As long as the markets return to normal and, more importantly, as risk appetite returns, there 
is a high probability of a resurgence in the local bond markets. 
4.   Central bank instruments to deal with the crisis 
(a)   Instruments at the disposal of the BCRA 
Facing an adverse scenario, the BCRA, like other central banks, started to deploy measures 
to ensure systemic liquidity and avoid abrupt fluctuations in exchange rates. These measures 
were accompanied by government countercyclical fiscal measures. In this context, it is worth 
noting that the Argentine economy was better prepared to face a crisis episode than in 
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previous years, due to the liquidity buffers reflecting fiscal and current account surpluses and 
the BCRA’s implementation of sound monetary and financial policies over the last five years. 
This included the implementation of countercyclical policies, generating liquidity buffers in 
local and foreign currencies, a managed floating exchange rate regime, and regulatory 
policies that boosted financial system soundness, limiting excessive risky exposures.  
Within this framework, the BCRA has been able to react to secure the normalisation of the 
demand for money and stabilise the FX market. During that period, the BCRA played an 
active role on the FX market in order to moderate volatility in the value of the peso and 
sterilise the monetary effect of foreign currency sales by injecting liquidity, mainly through the 
market for central bank bills (LEBAC) and notes (NOBAC), which proved to be an 
appropriate way to manage liquidity across the cycle (issuing notes when the peso supply 
was in excess of demand, and redeeming the notes when the peso supply was needed). As 
a result of the BCRA’s prudential policies and sound individual banking strategies, domestic 
financial entities exhibited high liquidity levels.  
In order to ensure the adequate management of liquidity risk, the BCRA developed additional 
liquidity windows with non-traditional collateral, redefined the rediscount window (with pre-
assessment of collateral, enhanced access to all funding sources – not only deposits), 
implemented larger facilities on the repo market (new lines in domestic and foreign currency), 
started to auction repo options, anticipated the buyback of central bank bills and notes 
(secondary market, automatic facility and put options) and implemented open market 
operations with government bonds. These measures, together with the BCRA’s role as 
lender of last resort, consolidated a sound banking system position to face liquidity risk. 
(b)   Determinants of monetary policy response  
There are several features that determine the capability of monetary policy to react to an 
international crisis. Among the most important for Argentina is the degree of dollarisation of 
the private and public sectors’ balance sheet, particularly on the liability side. As history has 
taught us, having large currency mismatches on an agents’ balance sheet has a strong 
impact on economic performance in the event of an international crisis. 
Figure 6  
FX and financial stability 
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However, the traditional use of interest rates as a countercyclical monetary response is not 
an appropriate option in Argentina given the existence of a shallow credit channel. This was 
the reason why policy rates were unchanged, and had nothing to do with fears of a large 
depreciation of the peso. 
Argentina has a managed floating exchange rate regime and, as such, the BCRA performs 
FX market operations to keep exchange rate volatility low given the high correlation between 
this variable and financial stability measured by term deposit withdrawals (see Figure 6). 
(c)   Support to interbank lending in local currency 
Much of the support occurred through changes or intervention in the repo market.  
  In order to avoid distorting the liquidity reserve characteristics of LEBAC and 
NOBAC, the BCRA decided to issue domestic LEBAC and NOBAC, which can only 
be traded locally, seeking to prevent short-term foreign investors from acquiring 
positions in these securities. 
  A scheme was established to offer liquidity at a fixed (up to 3 billion pesos) and a 
variable (BADLAR) interest rate. By offering a wider variety of options, the BCRA 
ensured the availability of resources in appropriate conditions to provide liquidity to 
the system. 
  Central bank securities coming due were renewed only partially and some other 
securities with near-term maturities were repurchased. 
  The BCRA began to carry out open market operations through the government 
securities market by purchasing instruments that could be liquidated in pesos or 
dollars in the secondary market. This mechanism worked as an additional tool to 
provide liquidity beyond the banking sector and, at the same time, enabled 
intervention on the various segments of the yield curve, avoiding distortions in its 
temporal structure. 
  To alleviate the seasonal effects on the traditionally illiquid month of July, the BCRA 
unified the financial institutions’ minimum cash requirement for June and July 
2007/08 in a single bimonthly term. This improved the institutions’ liquidity 
management. 
  A new liquidity window was opened to include as collateral certain instruments 
(Bogar and guaranteed loans) that cannot be used in traditional repo operations. 
This enabled institutions that had no significant central bank bills and notes positions 
in their portfolios to access the BCRA’s liquidity-providing mechanisms. 
  New maturity options for repos were offered, readjusting the cost in line with the new 
term structure. 
  The liquidity provision scheme was adapted to provide immediate liquidity to bank 
holders of LEBAC–NOBAC with a maturity of up to six months. 
  Repo interest rates were modified several times. 
  Auctions of put options on LEBAC and NOBAC. 
  A window to pre-qualify collateral for the illiquidity assistance regime was 
established. 
  The fixed-rate repo line was expanded to $10,000 million from the previous 
$3,000 million. 106  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
(d)   Measures taken to support foreign currency refinancing of banks/corporations 
The BCRA also took steps to support foreign currency financing. Measures included: 
  The limits to operate in the futures market, both for the BCRA and for some of its 
counterparties, were extended. 
  The reference FX rate for futures and forward transactions between the BCRA and 
its counterparties was allowed to be settled by the Emerging Market Traders 
Association (EMTA). This measure is clearly a vote of confidence in the BCRA’s 
approach. 
  A mechanism was developed for supplying US dollar-denominated repos. This was 
an additional way of ensuring dollar supply at times when the dollar increased its 
share in investors’ portfolios and when it was necessary to lower depreciation 
expectations. 
  The BCRA started to participate in the NDF market with operations up to 12 months 
and with counterparties whose credit quality was not lower than A–. 
  Auctions of US dollar repos with a pre-established interest rate directed to the 
financial system institutions that had previously increased their loans in US dollars to 
the export sector and had suffered a drop in US dollar deposits. 
(e)   Other instruments and their effectiveness 
The BCRA also used other instruments or took other measures to strengthen financial 
conditions, including: 
  Adjustments to minimum cash requirements. The minimum cash requirement on 
dollar deposits was reduced so that financial institutions could have more funds 
available to grant loans in this currency (for the tradable sector). In addition, the 
October and November 2008 minimum cash requirements were changed to a two-
month position. Changes were also made to the way in which cash holdings in 
banks are considered in the reserve requirements position. Specifically, financial 
entities were temporarily allowed to include their entire cash holdings in order to fulfil 
reserve requirements. 
  Currency swap arrangements. A currency swap arrangement with the People's 
Bank of China was agreed which will provide CNY 70 billion/ARS 38 billion. The 
effective period of the arrangement will be three years, and could be extended by 
agreement between the two sides. A currency swap arrangement was also agreed 
with the Banco Central do Brasil. 
  Interest rate swap auctions to help banks avoid mismatches in fixed and variable 
interest rates were established. 
(f)   Lessons learned from the role of FX reserves and interventions 
The crisis proved once again the need for prudential FX accumulation in the absence of an 
international lender of last resort and a set of inadequate lending facilities from the IMF. 
The accumulation of foreign reserves allowed most EMEs to withstand the crisis with no 
major impact on the domestic financial markets without recourse to the IMF, given its lack of BIS Papers No 54  107
 
 
assistance to fulfil the needs of EMEs with sound fundamentals but with a foreign currency 
liquidity shortage. 
In a framework marked by large capital inflows, the government decided, by means of 
Decree no 616 of 2005 and regulatory and complementary measures,
3 to deepen the 
instruments to follow up and control capital movements. Among the measures adopted was 
the obligation to set up a non-remunerated deposit at a one-year term (called a reserve) of 
30% of the inflow for certain concepts related to: (a) private sector foreign financial debt; (b) 
portfolio investments by non-residents; and (c) repatriations by residents that exceed 
USD 2 million monthly.
4 In addition, the minimum term for financial debt contracted abroad 
and for portfolio investment by non-residents was extended to a year. 
                                                  
3   Ministry of Finance Resolution no 365/05 and BCRA communications “A” 4359, 4360, 4377 and 4386.  
4   Exceptions are allowed for: (a) primary issuances of publicly quoted and traded debt instruments, loans from international 
organisations, loans used to cancel other debts abroad or direct investments in foreign companies and loans with average 
maturities of over two years used for investment in non-financial activities; (b) investments by non-residents to be used for 
primary subscriptions of shares and bonds publicly quoted for trading on self-regulated markets; and (c) repatriations by 




Argentina’s banking system 
 
Table 1 
Structure of the domestic banking system 
In domestic currency 
End of year (or latest available month for 2009) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total  assets  254,900 292,588 339,743 370,870 
Private domestic banks  82,585 93,968  109,073  115,501 
Foreign-owned  banks  69,829 81,541 99,815  102,948 
Subsidiaries  49,699 66,406 79,258 83,786 
Branches  20,130 15,135 20,557 19,162 
State-owned banks  102,486  117,079 130,855 152,421 
Total capital 
(*)  26,189 29,245 33,248 37,964 
Tier 1 capital as a % of total 
assets 
(**) 
11,2 11,2 10,4 10,2 
Memo items
1      
Total assets of non-bank 
financial institutions 
3,483 5,375 7,019 6,264 
Stock  market  capitalisation  157,118 179,771 137,815 163,252 
1 Total for the economy. 
(*)  RPC: Adjusted stockholders’ equity, calculated towards meeting capital regulations (Responsabilidad 
Patrimonial Computable). 
(**) The RPC (Responsabilidad Patrimonial Computable) is the result of: Basic Net Worth (Patrimonio Neto 
Básico) plus Complementary Net Worth, concepts that are net of deductible items (Conceptos Deducibles). In 
this case, Basic Net Worth is taken into account to build the ratio “Tier 1 capital as a % of total assets”. 
 





In domestic currency 
End of year (or latest available month for 2009) 
 2006  2007  2008  2009 
Total liabilities  222,954 257,103 300,447 327,083 
Foreign funding  11,789  10,632  10,615  9,689 
By source         
Banks (*)  4,240 3,864 4,541 3,611 
Other foreign fin’l insts      
Int’l money market instruments      
Int’l bonds issued by banks (**)  7,549 6,768 6,074 6,077 
Domestic funding  175,264  210,922  241,201  265,376 
Total deposits  170,402  204,783  235,529  261,176 
Households  71,718 87,610 92,897  101,463 
Non-financial private 
corporations 
51,225 66,681 72,854 82,712 
Government and public sector 
corporations 
45,410 48,340 67,102 73,078 
Other  2,049 2,152 2,676 3,922 
Domestic market funding  5,236  6,270  5,794  4,275 
Borrowing from other domestic 
fin’l insts 
4,731 4,683 4,436 3,296 
Domestic bonds issued by 
banks (**) 
506 1,587  1,357 979 
(*) Foreign lines of credit (USD). 
(**) Outstanding bonds and subordinated debt. 
 







End of year (or latest available month for 2009) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total  assets  254,900 292,588 339,743 370,870 
Total  loans  97,848  125,606 148,858 155,960 
Holdings of bonds
2  69.298 69.241 59.241 74.475 
Domestic        
Government (*)  37,131 31,814 27,085 34,453 
Central bank securities (**)  25,749 31,555 25,652 32,841 
Other (***)  6,418 5,872 6,504 7,149 
1 Including foreign currency loans, where applicable.  
2 ie debt securities held by banks with a fixed interest rate and maturity greater than one year. 
(*) Public sector. 
(**) Central bank bills and notes. 
(***) Includes total amounts of private bonds, financial trust, corporate outstanding bonds and subordinated 
debt.  
 




Bank lending (currency breakdown) 
In domestic currency, end of period  
 2006  2007  2008  2009 
Households 28,770  44,258  58,422  59,298 
Domestic currency  28,177 43,123 56,870 57,989 
Foreign currency
1 (*)  593 1,136  1,552  1,308 
Non-financial corporations  48,205  64,582  73,360  77,500 
Domestic currency  37,292 48,967 54,359 58,654 
Foreign currency
1 (*)  10,913 15,615 19,001 18,846 
Government and public sector 
corporations  20,873 16,765 17,077 19,163 
Domestic currency  20,784 16,699 17,047 19,134 
Foreign currency
1 (*)  89 67 30 29 
Total 97,848  125,606  148,858  155,960 
Domestic currency  86,253 108,789  128,275  135,777 
Foreign currency
1 (*)  11,595 16,817 20,583 20,183 
1 Or linked to the exchange rate; total of all currencies, in domestic currency terms. 
(*) In the case of foreign currency items, the exchange rates considered are those of the last day of each period. 
 
 